Bertrand Russell: Problems of Philosophy Chapter 3 The Nature of Matter

Summary: Believing that he has shown that accepting a world with mind-independent objects is more rational, Russell next considers the nature of these objects. He explains how the science of his day has reduced objects to their motions and positions in space. Scientists admit that the objects may have other properties, but do not require them to explain natural phenomena. However, scientific explanations do not explain our sensations: light is what we immediately see, not a form of wave-motion, even if the sense-data is caused by wave-motion. Thus, a blind man could understand the scientific assertion, but not understand the sensation of light. The sensations of color, sounds, and even our experience of space emerging from sense-data, are absent from scientific discourse. The coin that appears to be oval, but we judge to be intrinsically circular, is so in an idealized space. Hence, science/math's idealized "real space" is public, and apparent space is private. But how are these spaces connected? Russell summarizes the prior conclusion that our sensation of sense-data is caused by matter, independently-existing stuff. If this is the case, Russell believes this presupposes a physical space in which these objects and our bodies are contained where one can pass on sense-data to the other. Sensation of sense data occurs when persons are in contact with a given object (say, an apple) via close bodily proximity, and no other impeding objects (closed cupboard doors) are in the way. Variation occurs through the relative positioning of the body and other objects in science's physical space, and this is borne out well in our private experience. While different spaces emerge in sight, touch, and so forth, we learn to group them together since they bear a similar testament. Russell gives this example: if one sees a house that looks nearer to oneself than another, our kinaesthetic experience confirms this by it taking shorter to reach the house that appeared visually closer. These spaces interlace because there is an actual physical space.

But while private spaces testifies of the real space, we cannot know much about the real space. Russell asserts that we can know only what is required to secure correspondence betwen the private and physical spaces; we don't know anything about the physical space as it is in itself. What this boils down to is us only knowing the "properties of the relations" necessary for holding correspondence. We reason towards the real objects from the sense data, not through the sense-data (studying observations versus the observing). So we can know that during an eclipse, the earth, moon and sun are in one straight line, but not know what a real "straight line" is. We lack the immediate acquaintance with the real "straight line" that we have with a line drawn by a ruler in our private space. Our feeling of duration is often disparate with "clock time" depending on our mental states and activities, so that our experience of time is private, although we recognize there is also a physical time. Despite how long I perceived the basketball game as being, I understand that the tipoff occurred before the end game buzzer. This order of before and after that things appear to have seems to correspond to real time order. It is not the case that the real objects have the same time-order as the sense-data constituting the perception of those objects. Really speaking, thunder and lightning occur at the same time, although I hear the thunder later than its occurrence. Russell also notes the delay in observing star light. Turning to everyday objects, Russell gives more examples of us understanding relational differences in the "real world," due to differences in the apparent one. When 2 objects give visual sense-data of different colors, we reason that there must be something different about the real objects, even though we are not immediately aware of the quality in the real object making it have a specific color. We might naturally assume that the real object has a color (some intermediate color between the various shades appearing at different times and to different people) and if lucky we will catch a glimpse of it. But Russell thinks that this naivity is groundless as we consider the influence of light waves, air, our own eyes; we discover that color is the result of the travel of the ray reaching the eye, not originating in the object itself. Given that a natural assumption about objects' color is wrong, we might wonder if there is any philosophical argument (form/method of reasoning) that can show us if matter is real, it must have a certain nature, so that a more prolonged investigation is unnecessary.

Bertrand Russell: Problems of Philosophy Chapter 2 The Existence of Matter

Summary: Russell continues to consider the possible difference between appearance and reality. In the past, we instinctively believed that sense-data were equivalent to objects, but observation, discovery, and dreams have at least at times shown them to be disparate. Given this, we can wonder whether or not there is in the general sense "matter" : something behind the absolutely certain sense data that continues to exist when no one is looking or if no minds were to exist at all. Russell thinks that if we cannot ascertain a matter with independent existence, then we may lapse into solipsism. If others are only known via their bodies, and the independent existence of bodies is doubted, then the existence of other minds also becomes debatable. Russell admits solipsism as a possibility, but he thinks we have no reason to suppose its actuality. Next, Russell reviews the Cartesian methodology of systematic doubting anything not shown to be clearly and distinctly true. While Descartes believes the method leads him to the certainty of his own existence, Russell doubts this. Particular experiences have far more certainty than personal existence. The sensation of a color is far more "a color is being seen" rather than "I am seeing a color." Even though an experiencer may be presupposed, this does necessarily involve any "I." The main payoff of the Cartesian method is to show that primitive thoughts, feelings, and experiences are the most certain, even if the sensations are of illusions.

Can we infer from these primitives the existence of something else? Clearly, our common sense says yes. When we put a tablecloth over a table such that the sense data attributed to the table is hidden from view, we do not believe that the table has disappeared and that a levitating tablecloth remains in its place. However, common sense has often been wrong. We might next refer to our public commerce that involves the supposition of "public neutral objects," objects that are the same for all parties even though the sense data received by each person is privately received. We believe this due to the similarity of sense data being received. Russell, however, believes that this reasoning begs the question because other people are being used to prove that there actually are other people. If we are to make headway, we have to look at our private experiences and show that they tend to show that there are others. Russell doubts that this can be shown certainly (the dream sequence is always a logical possibility), but it can be shown probabilistically. Russell's mainly argues that the hypothesis that there are independent objects is simpler. Several observed regularities such as the motion, the hunger, and language of sets of sense data attributed to objects require less explanation if they belong to real objects. Russell admits this conclusion is weaker than we might hope, but he argues it is typical of philosophical arguments. He believes knowledge is based upon instinctive beliefs, so that if all are rejected, nothing is left. After all, we cannot have reason to reject a belief except on the ground of some other belief. Nonetheless, instinctive beliefs can through philosophical reflection be organized into an hierarchy that forms a harmonious, coherent system that is "most possible." Yet it remains possible that the whole system is mistaken, so a healthy bit of doubt should be applied to all beliefs.

NOTE: To relate Russell's tangent at the end of the chapter back to the case in point, Russell implicitly seems to be asserting that we can compare an explanation asserting the existence of independent objects and one that does not, and that while both may be coherent, the latter will require far more propositions to do so. Since it requires the acceptance of more propositions to explain sense data, it is "less possible," since we can imagine far more possible universes in a system that has less propositions (like the independent object explanation). If we place our bets with the more possible, we have a greater chance of being right if we rolled the cosmic dice. While this may be valid, it is debatable whether or not the non-independent object universe requires more propositions. Furthermore, even if this is the case, it may not give Russell what he wants to say here: that it is more reasonable to believe in what is more possible, and therefore it is more reasonable to believe in a world with matter when it comes to explaining sense data.

Bertrand Russell: Problems of Philosophy Chapter 1 Appearance and Reality

Summary: As we search for certain knowledge, we often start with listing statements about what we think our immediate experience absolutely shows us about the world. Such statements, such as claims of knowledge about the color of a nearby table, seem initially evident, but Russell thinks that methodical doubt can show that they are likely wrong. Russell notes the difference in color throughout the table, the change in color when lighting is removed or adjusted, the alteration of color as one moves, or the different color reported by a color-blind person. The same could be done with the claims about a table's texture. If one asserts the table is smooth, one could look through a microscope and see the hills and valleys in the grain. For Russell, as one digs down and tests these statements, one becomes aware of the difference between appearance (how things seemed) on the one hand, and reality (how things are discovered to be) on the other. As one continues to dig and discredit appearances, the questions arise is there a table at all, and if there is, what sort of object is it? Russell suggests that our common existential assertions about the table (its color, texture, etc.) are really about sense-data. Our immediate awareness of the data is sensation. While this data is sensed, we might honestly doubt whether there is something, a reality or "matter" behind the data. While the science of Russell's day views matter as "a vast collection of electric charges in violent motion," Russell treats matter as meaning something more general: anything that is "behind" the sense data.

For if matter is treated as something opposed to mind that occupies space, there have been several parties that historically have disagreed. Berkeley maintained that the sense-datum do stand for some outside reality, but this something is mental--minds or ideas entertained by the mind. He believed this is necessary to explain how we know the outside world: knowing the object is easy since qua idea it may inhabit the mind for a time. He supposed that if the reality of the table was drastically different from its appearance it could not be known. The ideas responsible for our sensation of sense-datum linger even when we are not present, sustained by the mind of God (where all ideas linger in its all-perceiving gaze). Russell observes that in absolute idealism Berkeley's concept of the all-perceiving mind of God is secularized into the collective mind of the universe. Russell summarizes the general idealist argument for an exclusively mental reality is: "'Whatever can be thought of is an idea in a thinker's mind; therefore nothing can be thought of except ideas in minds; therefore anything else is inconceivable, and what is inconceivable cannot exist." Russell rejects this argument, but also points out that idealism is not so radical about the question between appearance and reality. We can doubt the existence of a non-mental reality outside of appearance, but might we not also doubt any sort of reality altogether (matter in the more general sense)? We wonder, if reality is not the same as appearance, do we have any means of knowing whether there is any independent reality? And if we do, are there any means of knowing what that reality is like?