Rudolf Otto: The Idea of the Holy Chapter 3 The Elements in the Numinous

Summary: Otto asks the reader to direct himself towards a moment of what he would believe to be a quintessentially religious moment. If this cannot be done, Otto requests the reader to go no further. While not blameworthy, the ignorant often view aesthetics in terms of sensuous pleasure and religion as a funtion of gregarious instinct, but an artist will decline such a theory, and the religious uncompromisingly dismiss it. Otto takes one moment of numinous experience, that of solemn worship, and tries to isolate what is unique about it. Solemn worship no doubt shares common features with being morally uplifted, with feelings of "gratitude, trust, love, reliance, humble submission, and dedication." But solemn worship is not exhausted by these terms; there is something in the being "rapt" that is more. Schleiermacher focused on the "feeling of dependence," and while important, Otto believes this feeling is not unique to numinous experience: such as when one recognizes one is determined by societal circumstances and the environment (think of people's judgments about their power to change during economic depressions). Schleiermacher recognized that the religious dependence was different from the other forms, and suggested the difference was between absolute and relative dependence. Otto thinks Schleiermacher made a mistake in having the distinction being a matter of degree; it is a matter of intrinsic quality. While it provides a close analogy, mental analysis shows that the religious feeling is so primary a datum that it can only be defined via itself. Otto sees this numinous feeling in the biblical text, where Abraham asserts that he will speak to the Lord, recognizing that he himself is "but dust and ashes" (Genesis 18:27). There is dependence, but something more/other than just dependence, and so Otto labels this experience "creature-consciousness" (or "creature-feeling"). The creature is overwhelmed by its nothingness in contrast to the supreme. Otto argues that the term is not a conceptual explanation of the experience, since everything revolves around the character of the supreme, which is ineffable, only suggested via the tone and content of man's feeling-response to it. Otto further faults Schleiermacher by reducing the religious emotion to self-depreciation, and having God appear through inference to a cause beyond the self for this sense of dependence. Otto believes this is opposed to the psychological facts. Creature-consciousness is derived from another feeling-element that has immediate (not inferred) reference to a sensed numinous object outside the self. With an unjustifiably poor understanding of William James' philosophic position, Otto yet correctly observes that James concluded that accounts of religious experience suggest that in consciousness there is a "sense of reality" (in Varieties, this is the "consciousness of a presence") that is deeper in perceiving the real than the five senses. Otto sees creature-consciousness again as deriving from and presupposed by this feeling of a numinous object objectively given. The depreciation comes in recognition of that object, and is carried out by the subject.

Investigations into Religious Phenomena

A common topic amongst some of you and other philosophical friends in the past was what is philosophy of religion, its method, and what can it accomplish? We have discussed the place of theology (and "physical theology"), James' science of religion, transcendental philosophy of religion, and other possible avenues that might be unique (such as the ontological argument; not that I buy the argument, but it does take a different route). In general, I imagine our philosophical thinking in religion (amongst others) shows and attempts to remove contradiction and ellucidates/explains particulars, often through greater distinctions. These particulars are often done theologically (or intra-religiously), working and explaining a text or doctrinal propositions based on revelation claims. I have been interested, ever since reading James' Varieties of Religious Experience, in thinking about and explaining less "textual" religious matters, which are more external, in the sense of at least being intersubjective phenomena. And then I am interested in all elements of subjective religious consciousness. To poorly use "phenomenology" (as honestly it feels all do), I like trying to look at and explain phenomena that have a quasi-religious character about them(religious phenomenology). I wrote a quick list down of some of these (inluding more general thoughts) that probably needs to be pruned somewhat:

• The holy


• Beauty of existence


• Conversion


• Prayerfulness


• Revelation


• Religious testimony


• The ideal (heaven) and the longing for it


• Harmony


• Perfection


• Life's "purpose"


• Duty to the divine and religious guilt.


• The mystery of being (why do I exist, and in a greater sense, why is there anything at all instead of the nothing that might be in its place?). This one is strange, because it seems semi-religious, and yet also a place where the strictly philosophical emerge too. Perhaps it is a place of shared kinship?


• Covenant relationship and Covenant community


• The limits of reason and the feeling of something "more"


• Other "religious" values

Any others you might add to this list? My personal "acquaintance" with these things has made me want to examine them more fully, and the study of them seems a different track (investigatory) than other religious thought (which feels more puzzle piece fitting). I have started my study with a famous book that I haven't wanted to read for some time: Rudolf Otto's The Idea of the Holy. In it Otto, tries to isolate the unique content and feeling of holiness, which he will call the "numinous." You can find it for free off of archive.org if you want to follow along with me. I have finished the first 3 chapters and will start throwing up summaries as I go. After Otto's book, I will probably return (again) to James' Varieties, and from there I am open to suggestions. Some my old Faulconer readings come to mind...

William James: "What the Will Effects" Part 1

Summary: James begins his article by asserting that all animal activity belongs to reflex action; consciousness is simply an adjustment to the environment. Some reactions to the environment are voluntary and others are not. Surprisingly, James argues that the voluntary actions are derived from the involuntary. With involuntary action, the action is not mentally seen or understood until afterwards. In voluntary action properly called, the act is foreseen, the idea preceding its execution. Hence, no action can be voluntary the first time it is performed. Until we have done it, we have no idea of what sort of a thing it is like, and do not know in what direction to set our will to bring it about. We could not picture it, and one cannot will into the void. Once we get a sense for the feeling and what needs to be done, then we can train our voluntary power. Voluntary action is thus a secondary action, not of a primary sort. The consequence is that a creature with no memory can have no will, and that volitional utterances are built out of the automatic. James specifies that he does not mean a man cannot commit a murder voluntarily until he commits one involuntarily. Murder is a complex combination of movements, including crouching, springing, stabbing and the like. These elementary movements cannot voluntarily be performed unless already involuntarily performed.

Psychology’s second point is that our will needs nothing else but a recollection of how movements feel to execute its desires. They are sufficient conditions. All of us experience ideomotor actions. For example, while having a conversation we might become conscious of a pen on the floor, or of some dust on the sleeve. Without interrupting the conversation we brush away the dust or pick up the pen. No express resolve is made; the perception of the object and the fleeting notion of the act seem to bring the action about. James includes amongst these acts snacking on nuts when one is no longer hungry and they meet no express contradiction in the mind (if nothing stops it from having its way). With such actions, no separate fiat of the will is required. James generalizes his claim: anywhere and everywhere the sole known cause for the execution of a movement is the bare idea of the movement’s execution, and that if the idea occurs in a mind empty of other leading ideas, an attempted movement will fatally and infallibly take place. James suggests this is why the hypnotic subject passively acts out nearly every suggestion his operator makes. When ideas harmonize they reinforce a movement, but when they conflict, they block the path of its discharge and inhibit its motor efficacy. James urges that all our thoughts correspond to processes in the cerebral hemispheres. We know that certain thoughts conflict with others and that certain acts are only possible so long as objections to them do not arise. In fact, James thinks that most of our activity is not best described by a creative architectural volition, but by a nodding consent. Most of the time (James gives an arbitrary 75%) our conduct consists in taking off the brakes, and letting ideas and impulses have their way. Volition would in these cases lie in refusing consent. This refusal need not always be energetic either. Either consent or inhibition may require energy, but not as much as we think.

The ideas that most inhibit muscular activity, keep us quiet, are those of pains and pleasures. Think of the paralyzing effects of the bed’s warmth and of the cold in the room when you awaken. Pains and pleasures most urge us to action or to avoid an action. However, James denies psychological egoism: he declares it is absolutely false that pain and pleasure are the only possible or rational inciters to voluntary action. We can act from abstract goods and duties. Thus pleasure/pain regulates, but need not operate; steers, but need not propel. James believes experience alone can decide which ideas have power, and innumerable objects stimulate us. Ninety‐nine times out of a hundred we no more act for the pleasure connected with the action, than we do for the pleasure of the frowning, or blush for the pleasure of the blush. Often blind reactive impulses are there. A drunkard cannot often tell why so often falls prey to temptation. His nerve‐centers are unlocked by every passing conception of a bottle and a glass. He does not thirst for the beverage; the taste of it may even appear repugnant; and he perfectly foresees the morrow’s remorse. But when he thinks of or sees liquor, he finds himself preparing to drink and does not stop himself; more than this he cannot say. James summarizes his thoughts: We are mobile organisms placed in environments full of things that pull and clamp the triggers of our muscular machinery in various pre‐appointed ways. This is the involuntary life. But these involuntary actions form likenesses in images and pleasure‐pain consequences (amongst others). These images in turn incite to new discharges and reinforce and inhibit each other like the originals. This is the volitional life of consent.