Hey Eric, I enjoyed reading this article. It made me reflective of my philosophical experience at BYU. In college, I took numerous continental (kierkegaard, heidegger, merleau-ponty, continental philosophy of religion) and analytic (metaphysics, Wittgenstein, epistemology, ethics, etc.) classes, in addition to numerous ones in the pragmatic tradition, which becomes difficult to slot.
I myself find it difficult to appreciate much of the continental tradition for a couple of reasons that the article brought up:
(1) The excessive esoteric themes and terminology of continental philosophy. Trying to be "initiated" in the movement seems unbearable! You hear a few continental ideas and you think, that's sort of neat (although the ideas aren't the best justified; sort of referred to by intuition/introspection), but when you turn to a text!!! UGH. I'd throw out all of the "literary style" if I could just figure out what they were trying to say. I have read a section of Heidegger 5 times and still thought, "Am I missing something?" This does happen on the analytic side too--I have read Peirce's A New Theory of the Categories and smack my head again and again trying to understand it. But the focus on technical rigor and systematic thought with the analytics helps their coherence in my opinion. When I even pick up Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Locke, Leibniz, Descartes, other 17th-18th c. philosophers, I feel that they are inviting me over to their campfire, treat my like a brother, and I can understand them. The Continental approach makes me think that they are shutting the door, and snubbing me from entering into their elite gathering. Yet some like Merleau-Ponty showed technical rigor, and referenced much of the experimental psychology of the day. This created its own difficulty of understanding, but for different reasons (preferable, IMO). Merleau-Ponty seemed far more open-minded, and his method seemed to allow for his positions to be overturned by further research, thought, etc.
(2) The lack of background in continental philosophy. Continental philosophy with its highly political, tradition-critiquing project doesn't really fit into the undergraduate philosophical coursework well. Not that it doesn't have a clear place in the history, but it isn't introduced to students in a coherent manner. Students are energized with non-systematic and anti-scientist thinking before they even are familiar with scientific thought or systematic philosophies. Continental thought only seems to make sense with being HUGELY versed in a LENGTHY western philosophical tradition, which most students are not. Continentals are referring left and right to medieval thinkers--Meister Eckhart, Nicolas Cuso--and less accessible thinkers (Suarez), and using their terminology as if the lay person could understand that. Not possible. While I am certain there are analytics that have this problem as well, it seems that on the whole they are not as guilty of this problem. I can pick up a David Armstrong, Charles Sanders Peirce or David K. Lewis text and jump almost straight in and understand it if not in the first read, in a good part by the second. I think the continental philosophical position would greatly benefit from a background bridge to their thought.
(3) Pointless attack on reason by continental philosophers. I don't understand the destruction and attack of reason... what are we doing? How can we trust our method of attack and conclusions if we have deposed the very thing that guided us and was supposed to make us understand? Many continental philosophers DO NOT do this, but for those that do, I look at them like the loony crackpot. I am fine with the Kantian/Wittgensteinian path of limiting the scope of reason, and recognizing (or at least admitting the possibility of) a la Peirce/James/etc. of non-rational forms of understanding. But the other project I am honestly baffled by. Like the post pointed out, the supposed liberation of thought that continentals achieved also was a closing of deliberation. I don't understand what we are doing anymore when we throw out our analytic mental faculties and tools. I don't even know how to talk to people that draw these conclusions or how to critique their conclusions. Some hear "metaphysics," and they seem to want to run. Why? Their anti-metaphysical conclusions seem at least as poorly (if not more poorly) justified as another's metaphysical ones, and often seem to presuppose metaphysical ones that they were supposed to avoid.
As for the analytics, I think it is good to consider the political ramifications of one's thought. But the fact that it has some, doesn't inherently make it bad. Some continental labels on analytic works seem immediately to make them anathema. One thing that I hate analytic thinkers for is there quick dismissal of certain avenues of thought. Philosophy should have no intellectual boundaries (except those inherent in an intellect itself I suppose), and I am concerned by those that arbitrarily dismiss thinkers or positions (like idealism). Likewise, I dislike analytics who dismiss phenomenology. It is where the wonder begins; where we are supposed to pique our curiousity about our surroundings and not put our heads in the sand. Phenomenology helps us determine the whatness of our discussion--what is it our theories are trying to account for and what elements require explanation? I think phenomenology is also democratic. When we recognize the whatness of must be explained, we can appreciate multiple forms of explanation that account for all of the same elements. We don't then, just toss out idealism offhand. But phenomenology has not and is definitely no longer limited to continental thinkers. I think analytics at the University of Arizona (Terry Horgan, Mark Timmons) do some of the best phenomenology that I can think of.
In the end, I think analytics have the upper hand in this debate, because they have far less IMO to correct. Being more open-minded and recognizing the historicity of one's thought I think is a far easier adjustment that what I outlined above as being problematic for continental thought. Of course, whether it is easy to change the attitude of the analytic thinkers is a different question.
Your critiques of Continental thought are all pretty solid, I'd say. I think what brings me back to it again and again is its creative impulse. I feel similarly about many continental thinkers as I do about good passages of scripture. They are often poetic in nature, not at all systematic, but they are extremely fertile ground. As I read them, my understanding of the universe is perforated and intellectual growth is encouraged. It's an exciting thing for me, and what I truly love about philosophy.
I am ok, by and large, with the fact that this does not make me a "real" philosopher. If that is true, I'll accept my new title, whatever it is, and continue seeking inspiration from writers stretching the bounds of language and understanding to try and wring out new and fruitful ways of thinking about things.
Additionally, I am happy with the continuing synthesis/ignoring of the divide by contemporary philosophers. The project I'm working on right now, centered on Object-Oriented Ontology and philosophy of objects, seems to refreshingly incorporate aspects of both traditions.
Hey Eric, I enjoyed reading this article. It made me reflective of my philosophical experience at BYU. In college, I took numerous continental (kierkegaard, heidegger, merleau-ponty, continental philosophy of religion) and analytic (metaphysics, Wittgenstein, epistemology, ethics, etc.) classes, in addition to numerous ones in the pragmatic tradition, which becomes difficult to slot.
ReplyDeleteI myself find it difficult to appreciate much of the continental tradition for a couple of reasons that the article brought up:
(1) The excessive esoteric themes and terminology of continental philosophy. Trying to be "initiated" in the movement seems unbearable! You hear a few continental ideas and you think, that's sort of neat (although the ideas aren't the best justified; sort of referred to by intuition/introspection), but when you turn to a text!!! UGH. I'd throw out all of the "literary style" if I could just figure out what they were trying to say. I have read a section of Heidegger 5 times and still thought, "Am I missing something?" This does happen on the analytic side too--I have read Peirce's A New Theory of the Categories and smack my head again and again trying to understand it. But the focus on technical rigor and systematic thought with the analytics helps their coherence in my opinion. When I even pick up Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Locke, Leibniz, Descartes, other 17th-18th c. philosophers, I feel that they are inviting me over to their campfire, treat my like a brother, and I can understand them. The Continental approach makes me think that they are shutting the door, and snubbing me from entering into their elite gathering. Yet some like Merleau-Ponty showed technical rigor, and referenced much of the experimental psychology of the day. This created its own difficulty of understanding, but for different reasons (preferable, IMO). Merleau-Ponty seemed far more open-minded, and his method seemed to allow for his positions to be overturned by further research, thought, etc.
(2) The lack of background in continental philosophy. Continental philosophy with its highly political, tradition-critiquing project doesn't really fit into the undergraduate philosophical coursework well. Not that it doesn't have a clear place in the history, but it isn't introduced to students in a coherent manner. Students are energized with non-systematic and anti-scientist thinking before they even are familiar with scientific thought or systematic philosophies. Continental thought only seems to make sense with being HUGELY versed in a LENGTHY western philosophical tradition, which most students are not. Continentals are referring left and right to medieval thinkers--Meister Eckhart, Nicolas Cuso--and less accessible thinkers (Suarez), and using their terminology as if the lay person could understand that. Not possible. While I am certain there are analytics that have this problem as well, it seems that on the whole they are not as guilty of this problem. I can pick up a David Armstrong, Charles Sanders Peirce or David K. Lewis text and jump almost straight in and understand it if not in the first read, in a good part by the second. I think the continental philosophical position would greatly benefit from a background bridge to their thought.
(3) Pointless attack on reason by continental philosophers. I don't understand the destruction and attack of reason... what are we doing? How can we trust our method of attack and conclusions if we have deposed the very thing that guided us and was supposed to make us understand? Many continental philosophers DO NOT do this, but for those that do, I look at them like the loony crackpot. I am fine with the Kantian/Wittgensteinian path of limiting the scope of reason, and recognizing (or at least admitting the possibility of) a la Peirce/James/etc. of non-rational forms of understanding. But the other project I am honestly baffled by. Like the post pointed out, the supposed liberation of thought that continentals achieved also was a closing of deliberation. I don't understand what we are doing anymore when we throw out our analytic mental faculties and tools. I don't even know how to talk to people that draw these conclusions or how to critique their conclusions. Some hear "metaphysics," and they seem to want to run. Why? Their anti-metaphysical conclusions seem at least as poorly (if not more poorly) justified as another's metaphysical ones, and often seem to presuppose metaphysical ones that they were supposed to avoid.
ReplyDeleteAs for the analytics, I think it is good to consider the political ramifications of one's thought. But the fact that it has some, doesn't inherently make it bad. Some continental labels on analytic works seem immediately to make them anathema. One thing that I hate analytic thinkers for is there quick dismissal of certain avenues of thought. Philosophy should have no intellectual boundaries (except those inherent in an intellect itself I suppose), and I am concerned by those that arbitrarily dismiss thinkers or positions (like idealism). Likewise, I dislike analytics who dismiss phenomenology. It is where the wonder begins; where we are supposed to pique our curiousity about our surroundings and not put our heads in the sand. Phenomenology helps us determine the whatness of our discussion--what is it our theories are trying to account for and what elements require explanation? I think phenomenology is also democratic. When we recognize the whatness of must be explained, we can appreciate multiple forms of explanation that account for all of the same elements. We don't then, just toss out idealism offhand. But phenomenology has not and is definitely no longer limited to continental thinkers. I think analytics at the University of Arizona (Terry Horgan, Mark Timmons) do some of the best phenomenology that I can think of.
In the end, I think analytics have the upper hand in this debate, because they have far less IMO to correct. Being more open-minded and recognizing the historicity of one's thought I think is a far easier adjustment that what I outlined above as being problematic for continental thought. Of course, whether it is easy to change the attitude of the analytic thinkers is a different question.
Your critiques of Continental thought are all pretty solid, I'd say. I think what brings me back to it again and again is its creative impulse. I feel similarly about many continental thinkers as I do about good passages of scripture. They are often poetic in nature, not at all systematic, but they are extremely fertile ground. As I read them, my understanding of the universe is perforated and intellectual growth is encouraged. It's an exciting thing for me, and what I truly love about philosophy.
ReplyDeleteI am ok, by and large, with the fact that this does not make me a "real" philosopher. If that is true, I'll accept my new title, whatever it is, and continue seeking inspiration from writers stretching the bounds of language and understanding to try and wring out new and fruitful ways of thinking about things.
Additionally, I am happy with the continuing synthesis/ignoring of the divide by contemporary philosophers. The project I'm working on right now, centered on Object-Oriented Ontology and philosophy of objects, seems to refreshingly incorporate aspects of both traditions.